Who Owns Gilgit-Baltistan’s Land? A Legal Tangle Rooted in History and Rights
By Dr. Saeed Abbas
In May 2024, the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Land Reforms Act (GBLRA)—a sweeping legislative overhaul that aims to reclassify all uncultivated land in the region. Touted by some as a long-overdue departure from colonial-era Nautore laws, the Act redraws the region’s land governance map—dividing it into Government Land, Common Partible Land, and Common Impartible Land. Yet, far from achieving clarity or justice, this law has ignited an unprecedented political and legal firestorm.
From Gilgit to Ghizer, and Nagar to Baltistan, waves of public demonstrations have erupted. Protestors, ranging from nationalist leaders and students to bar councils and clergy have denounced the Act as a vehicle of dispossession, not reform. The slogan “Kabze par kabza namanzoor” (“We reject repeated occupations”) now echoes through the valleys.
The core of this resistance lies in a fundamental question: Who has the right to define, distribute, and own land in a disputed territory governed more by custom than codified law?
Disputed Territory, Unilateral Law: Under UN Security Council Resolution 47 (1948), Gilgit-Baltistan forms part of the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Both Pakistan and India are bound not to unilaterally alter their status. By reclassifying vast swathes of land and effectively extending Pakistani land law to GB without a referendum or constitutional status, the GBLRA walks a fine, and dangerous line.
It’s not just a question of territory. It’s also about rights. Pakistan has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and committed to principles under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including self-determination and property rights. However, the GBLRA was passed without public consultation, offers no meaningful judicial oversight, and grants sweeping powers to bureaucratic land boards dominated by political elites. The community, ironically, is left out of “community land” management.
History Doesn’t Support the Act’s Premise: The legal and political histories of Hunza, Nagar, Diamer, Darel, and Tangir complicate the issue further.
In 1947, the rulers of Hunza and Nagar acceded to Pakistan under limited terms, mostly concerning defense and foreign affairs, while retaining internal autonomy. These were not simple mergers but conditional accessions, made during the chaotic aftermath of Partition and amid international calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The central government only abolished formal autonomy in 1974, repealing the State Subject Rule and opening the door for non-locals to settle.
In contrast, Diamer, Darel, and Tangir never signed accession treaties. Their alignment with Pakistan came in 1952, via tribal agreements and jirga resolutions. Yet, the GBLRA preserves the autonomy and land rights of these regions, while conveniently ignoring the more formal 1947 deeds of Hunza and Nagar. This selective recognition not only reveals political bias but risks stoking ethnic and regional tensions.
A Legal Framework Without a Legal Anchor: The Act’s most contentious clauses go well beyond historical oversights. It creates centralized Apportionment Boards with final, unchallengeable authority over land distribution. Retroactive legalizations of decades-old land allotments, many made behind closed doors are now validated without scrutiny.
A particularly egregious clause allows for eviction within 15 days from any land designated as government property without judicial hearing. Section 18 bars any court from reviewing board decisions, undermining Articles 4 and 10 of Pakistan’s Constitution which guarantee fair trial and due process.
Many fear this is a pretext for elite land capture, especially in areas rich in minerals, water, or tourism potential.
Traditional Livelihoods at Risk: Gilgit-Baltistan’s economy and culture are inseparable from its landscapes. Pastoralists, farmers, and mountain communities depend on access to seasonal pastures, springs, and shared grazing lands. By branding these areas as “Common Impartible Lands” that cannot be allotted, the Act seems to protect them—yet in reality, it places them under vague state custody, without spelling out rights of access or use. Without secure community control, these commons may quietly become commercial assets.
Women, minorities, and destitute groups are all promised land allocations—but nowhere does the law define how. In a region where land inheritance has long been governed by custom, this vagueness could deepen exclusion.
Legality at Home and Abroad: Pakistan’s own Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged Gilgit-Baltistan’s unique constitutional status. In the landmark Al-Jehad Trust case (1999), the Court recognized GB residents as full citizens entitled to democratic representation and judicial protection. In 2019, it declined to extend full jurisdiction over the region, emphasizing its “interim” status under international law.
By bypassing community consent and limiting judicial oversight, the GBLRA conflicts with both these precedents and international law.
Diplomatic Fallout and International Scrutiny: India will likely raise the GBLRA in global forums as an unlawful alteration of disputed territory. Human rights bodies may also weigh in. Pakistan’s moral authority in advocating for Kashmiri self-determination is weakened when it imposes laws on GB that override the will of its people.
What Must Be Done: Rather than forcing reforms from the top, Pakistan should:
- Restore judicial review by amending Sections 15 and 18.
- Recognize all historical accession deeds equally.
- Include jirgas and traditional leaders in land verification and allocation.
- Safeguard mountain commons through environmental regulations, not vague “impartibility” clauses.
- Ensure women, minorities, and landless people are clearly included with binding provisions.
Conclusion: Reform, Not Recolonization: The repeal of colonial land laws should have been an opportunity for empowerment—not appropriation. Instead, the GBLRA reflects a top-down, bureaucratic approach that disregards the complex legal, historical, and ecological realities of Gilgit-Baltistan.
A true land reform should secure tenure, honor tradition, and uphold justice—not repackage old exclusions under a new name. The people of GB deserve nothing less.
