Chillas Terrorist Attack: Colonial Echoes in Contemporary Statecraft
By Shah Zaman
During an anticipating serene weekend, the tragic news of Chillas terror attack jolted my soul. When you are thousands of miles from your homeland, all the parochial biases dissolve, fostering a kinship with fellow citizens. I spent that whole weekend shattered, looking at pictures and videos of the incident on social media. Particularly heart-wrenching was the story of Kamal Abbas, who filmed his departure before boarding that ill-fated bus. The thought that so many youthful dreams on the bus were extinguished prematurely still haunts me. The revelation that Kamal was a dog lover and thinking about the severed human-animal bond amplified one’s grief.
We mourned the loss of nine fellow citizens last Saturday, and today, after a week, I should be writing about the details of a decisive action against the perpetrators of this heinous act. However, I did not see such wonders and could only see a vacuum ahead. This incident has rekindled the enduring crisis of identity and justice in Gilgit-Baltistan, and the unsettled questions around such tragedies in the past have resurfaced. These unanswered questions, roaming in the body and mind of Gilgit-Baltistan related to the unfinished tasks of providing justice, produce the “Zeigarnik Effect,” which gives liberty to everyone in the civil and political state to offer their conflicting answers, leading to political cognitive dissonance. The body and mind of Gilgit Baltistan, marked by this psychological phenomenon, merits a separate and in-depth discussion. Presently, the focus is on intertwining historical colonial legacies with our current predicaments. Historical parallels, such as the administrative and military approaches of our former colonial masters, might offer valuable insights into contemporary counterterrorism strategies.
In September of 1945, Major Brown assumed the role of Assistant Political Agent (APA) Chillas from Peter Inchbald. His pragmatic approach encompassed the importance of peace for effective governance in a colonized setting; therefore, he swiftly scans the security situation in the region. Brown’s initial assessment revealed a disturbing pattern of daily, unresolved murders, often resulting from entrenched tribal and personal feuds. The complicity of the tribal council (Jirga) in these injustices was apparent where the murderers could easily get away with the charges by bribing the members of Jirga. He was briefed about the presence of a gang of fugitives with established headquarters in the tribal belt and found that these hired gunmen were involved in most of the murders in the sub-agency.
Major Brown reads the pulse of Chillas and decides to address their desire for peace. Brown’s strategic vision was clear; lasting peace in Chillas was contingent upon neutralizing the epicenter of terrorism — the entrenched network of fugitives. He issued a decree of severe punishment for anyone found harboring the fugitives and failing to report their presence in any part of Chillas. He also warned the village headmen of severe consequences had they been found guilty of facilitating these terrorists. After issuing the official decree, he formed an intricate network of spies and informers to stay one step ahead of these terrorists. He shares his experiences, “I think the dangerous life led by outlaws breeds in them a sixth sense which unwittingly protects them from danger.”
Major Brown exercised the state’s brute force (Levies and Scouts) with multiple raids, forays, bribes, and rewards to spies and informers and employed all foul and fairways to capture the terror mongers in Chillas. The APA sent clear signals to the 30 fugitives operating in groups and individually across Chillas that anyone who challenged his small hegemonic structure would cease to exist. In less than one year, till May 1946, he captured 20 fugitives while the remaining ten were on the run. He also ensured the normal functioning of the state and gave a fair trial to the captured terrorists before deciding their destiny. He writes, “The trial of such offenders was very summary, and nearly all of them confessed, and it was merely a matter of establishing their guilt on paper.”
He narrates a breathtaking story of military genius about capturing a notorious terrorist called X, wanted for the murder of a woman and a man while prostrating (sajda) inside a crowded Chillasi mosque. On a fine evening, one of the spies informed him about the presence of X in Z’s home in a village 25 miles away. Brown summoned his aides, gave them a “cut and dried” plan, and the team left for the village at 9 p.m. He made two prisoners previously arrested for minor crimes part of the team. They deeply hated X and were promised freedom in exchange for guidance on the mission’s success. The team, led by Brown, embarked on their journey under the cover of night, navigating the challenging terrain to reach the village by 4 a.m. Upon arrival, Brown blocked all the exits of the village and deployed his men strategically: some were positioned on all the high points, others armed with heavy rifle power were prepared for a potential fire exchange if X was present with his gang, and a strike forced was stationed half a mile outside the village. Brown entered the village at 6:15 a.m. with the remaining men for a systematic search and ordered everyone in the village to assemble in a central open space. Brown and one of his senior military aid Shah Khan were searching in the houses, the news arrived about the capture of X while fleeing from the village. This operation, characterized by meticulous planning and execution, is a testament to Major Brown’s resolve and strategic foresight.
When presented, X saluted the Major and extended his hand to shake. They showed respect to each other which is quite typical between the hunter and hunted at the end of the game. Brown inquired about how X has lived in the village for the last week and dismissed the village headman from his appointment for harboring a terrorist and failing to report his presence. Arriving at his headquarters by 5 p.m., Brown settled into his chair, a pipe in one hand and a glass of whisky in the other, enveloped in a profound sense of accomplishment. In the last twenty hours, he had traversed 50 miles in the mountains, ascended and then descended 6000 feet and captured a dangerous terrorist. Beside this, in an attempt to make Chillas a model sub agency of Gilgit the Assistant Political Agent equivalent to an Assistant Commissioner (AC) in today’s bureaucracy also claims to improve education, agriculture, forestry, irrigation, encourage social upliftment, growth of local industries and gets all the credit to form a competitive Chillas Polo team.
The current political state of Gilgit-Baltistan is facing a similar situation in Chillas. Unlike a 24 years old junior office of the British Army stationed among strangers thousands of miles away from his home country, the current state enjoys massive human and technological intelligence apparatus with an equally strong state machinery to implement its hegemony. Despite possessing these advanced intelligence capabilities, the region faces recurring security lapses. The citizens of Gilgit-Baltistan, bearing the unending pain of these failures, rightfully raise the questions: Why does this repeated massive intelligence failure occur in the same region? What else is required to arrest the terrorists in this and other similar incidents in the past? Who harbors them? Where do they come from and go to? Terrorist attack like these is a serious breach of social contract between the state and the people of GB and it would further weaken the already shaken trust. No mother in GB should mourn the death of her handsome son like Kamal Abbas and eight others, no mother like Roshan Bi Bi should fight like a soldier to save her children and husband and no poet like Ghulam Hussain Balghari who preached peace all life, should receive a dead body in his village this way.
Concluding, the political state with its massive intelligence apparatus should sit, meditate, clear its mind, and apply the brutal state force against these terrorist networks without any categorization. Failure to unmask the terrorists and their handlers in this incident and before this will produce “Zeigarnik Effect” resulting in cognitive dissonance in the body and mind of a liminal state. It will damage the social contract and allow establishing a trustworthy relationship with other non-state actors beyond borders eager to produce a counter hegemony. After 78 years, if a 24 year old British Officer’s governance strategies serve as a mirror for self-evaluation, the state should seriously consider course correction and policy paradigm shift.
The writer is a Ph.D. scholar at a US based university.
